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that the damage suffered by respondents is merely incidental and
that recovery should consequently be denied. 10 This position is not
tenable, for if the government had taken an easement of flight over
the land of the respondents, and this easement were permanent, then
it follows as a natural consequence that the easement would be the
equivalent of a fee interest. It would be construed as constituting
complete dominion and control over the land.
In the instant case, as in Portsmouth Co. v. United States," the
damages were not merely consequential in nature. They resulted
from a direct invasion of the respondents' domain. As pointed out in
United States v. Cress,12 ".... it is the character of the invasion, not
the amount of damage resulting from it, so long as the damage is
substantial, that determines the question whether it is a taking."
Although the meaning of "property" as this term is used in the Fifth
Amendment is a federal question,

".

.

. it will normally obtain its

content by reference to local law." 13 According to North Carolina
law, sovereignty in the air space rests in the state "except where
granted to and assumed by the United States." '4 The flight of aircraft over land is considered lawful unless deemed to be an interference with the beneficial use thereof. Here there was such interference and the Courts' view was that the specific facts would seem
to warrant the conclusion that there had been a servitude imposed
upon the respondents' land.
The question herein presented has novel aspects and has not
heretofore been directly passed upon. Mr. Justice Douglas in delivering the opinion of the Court refers to the case as one of "first
impression." The decision will probably lead to additional legislation by Congress on the subject of air travel in view of its ever
increasing importance and complexity.
I.L.

INSURANcE -CoNTRACTs
-RIGHT
OF BENEFICIARY TO SUE
AFTER PERIOD OF LIMITATION IN POLIcY.-The defendant company

issued to Jules B. Selden two policies of accident insurance; in one
of them the beneficiary was Selden's mother, in the other his estate.
He died on December 31, 1941, from a gunshot wound. The policies provided that affirmative proof of loss must be furnished to
the company within ninety days after the date of such loss. Proof
1o Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U. S. 546, 58 L. ed. 1088
(1914).
1"-260 U. S. 327, 67 L. ed. 287 (1922).
12 243 U. S. 316, 328, 61 L. ed. 746, 753 (1916).
'1 United States ex rel. T. V. A. v. Powelson, 319 U. S. 266, 279, 87 L. ed.

1390, 1400 (1942).

14 GEN. STATS. 1943,

§ 63-11.
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was furnished within the prescribed time in the case of the policy in
which the estate was beneficiary. The mother, however, had no
knowledge of the existence of the policy in her favor until it was
found on February 22, 1943. The day following her discovery of
the policy, the plaintiff beneficiary requested the defendant company
to furnish her with proof of loss forms, which was refused. On
March 19, she filed proof of loss under the policy, and on September
8, 1944 she brought suit. This was more than two years and ninety
days from the date of the insured's death. The defense set up is,
a provision in the policy which stipulated that no action shall be
brought to recover on the policy unless commenced within two years
from the expiration of the time within which proof of loss is required by the policy, and the complaint was dismissed. Held, affirmed.
Ignorance as to the existence of a policy of insurance will not excuse
the beneficiary's failure to comply with its provisions. Selden v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co, - Pa. -, 47 A. (2d) 687 (1946).
A provision in the policy for some reasonable time within which
an action must be brought is valid and enforceable." The benefi-2
ciary is subject to all the provisions and limitations of the policy.
The plaintiff contends that her failure to bring suit in time should
be excused because of her ignorance as to the existence of the policy,
and therefore because of an alleged impossibility of performance.
But a person is not relieved from compliance with the express provisions of a contract whether because of ignorance of his rights, or
even of the very existence of the contract; if the other party has not
been guilty of any fraud which has caused such ignorance, the loss
must be borne by the party in default, however innocent he may be.
The court may not add, to the unambiguous terms of the policy, an
exemption clause which the parties themselves omitted.
There was a dissenting opinion which held that the plaintiff
should have had a reasonable time within which to file proofs of loss
after she found the policy, if such failure to discover the policy was
through no fault or negligence on her part.3 The limitation on her
ability to commence an action, then, would not begin to run until
the expiration of the "reasonable time" after she found the policy.
The view taken by the majority of the states disagrees with the
decision in this case. The general rule prevailing in this country
seems to be that where one is ignorant as to the existence of a policy
of life or accident insurance in his favor, strict compliance with its
provisions as to proofs of loss, notice, or the bringing of an action
may be excused, if those provisions are complied with within a reasonable time following the discovery of the policy. 4 A qualification
I Ercole v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 155 Pa. Super. 549, 39 A. (2d) 293
(1944) ; National Fire Ins. Co. v. Brown, 128 Pa. 386, 18 Ati. 389 (1889).
2 Miller v. Travelers Ins. Co., 143 Pa. Super. 270, 17 A. (2d) 907 (1941).
37 CoucH, CYCoPFrA oF INsURANcE LAW (1929) § 1538k.
4 Konrad v. Union Casualty and Surety Co., 49 La. Ann. 636, 21 So. 721
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to this rule requires that the lack of knowledge must be without
negligence or fault of the party seeking to be excused.6 Applying
the general rule to this case, it would appear that the case should
have gone to the jury, in order to determine whether the plaintiff
was negligent in failing to discover the policy.
Section 164, subdivision 3(n)14, of the New York Insurance
Law provides that no action shall be maintained on a policy unless
brought within two years from the expiration of the time within
which proof of loss is required by the policy. Whether ignorance
as to the existence of the policy will excuse the beneficiary from
filing proofs of loss within ninety days after the date of the loss, as
required by Section 164, subdivision 3(g)7, of the New York Insurance Law, is a question that has not as yet been squarely met
in the New York courts. It has been held that although the ten- or
twenty-day period after the accident, within which notice must be
given, 6 may be extended by necessity (the notice may be given as
soon as reasonably possible) 7 the period within which proof of loss
must be filed may not be extended. The filing of the proof of loss
ithin that period is an absolute condition precedent to the plaintiff's
right to recover on the policy, unless the policy expressly states that
such failure to comply will be excused if shown to be not reasonably
possible."
In the case at hand, since the insurance contract did not adopt
this language which would overcome the strictness of the rule, the
period within which proof of loss should have been filed was not
extended. It terminated ninety days after the loss, at which time
the two-year period of limitation commenced to run, and having run
out, the plaintiff is barred from bringing an action.
W. C. B.

LANDLORD AND TENANT - CONSTRUCTIVE EvIcTION. - The
premises involved, an apartment in a multiple dwelling unit, were
extensively damaged by a fire. The landlord in this action seeks to

(1897); McElroy v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 88 Md. 137, 41 Atl. 112
(1898); Munz v. Standard Life and Accident Ins. Co., 26 Utah 69, 72 Pac.
182 (1903).
5 Schanzenback v. American Life Ins. Co., 58 S. D. 528, 237 N. W. 737
(1931).
8
N. Y. INSuRANcE LAW § 164, subds. 3(d), 4.
7Walterman v. Mutual Benefit Health and Accident Assn., 260 App. Div.
478, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 158 (1st Dep't 1940); MacKay v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 281 N. Y. 42, 46, 22 N. E. (2d) 154, 156 (1939).
8Trieger v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident Assn., 122 Misc. 159,
202 N. Y. Supp. 410 (Sup. Ct. 1923) ; see Titus v. Travelers Ins. Co., 268 App.
Div. 802, 49 N. Y. S. (2d) 203 (2d Dep't 1944); Trippe v. P. F. Society, 140
N. Y. 23, 35 N. E. 316 (1893).

